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Abstract
Does the federal minimum wage in Germany introduced in 2015 improve the income
situation of low income households and reduce in-work poverty? Previous literature on
its distributional impact was either focused on earnings and hourly wages (e.g. Caliendo
et al., 2017), or is based on ex-ante simulations (e.g. Müller and Steiner, 2013). This
paper provides systematic descriptive ex-post evidence on the distributional implications
of the German minimum wage on wages and disposable household incomes as well as
some underlying mechanisms.
We analyze various measures of hourly wage and disposable household income dis-
tributions, both, for the group of affected individuals and the entire population. Most ap-
proaches identify individuals affected by the minimum wage based on pre-reform wages
ignoring large job fluctuations and measurement error at the bottom of the wage distri-
bution. In contrast, we define the group of affected by people’s relative position in the
wage distribution in each respective year. Full compliance scenarios are simulated at the
actual and markedly higher minimum wage levels to interpret observational outcomes
and gauge the redistributive potential of the minimum wage.
We find evidence for wage increases at the bottom of the wage distribution. Effects
on wage inequality are limited because of non-compliance, difficulties in hourly wage
measurement in certain types employment, and unequal wage growth across the distri-
bution. Confirming previous simulation evidence the minimum wage proves to be an in-
effective tool for the redistribution of disposable household incomes. Overall inequality
has even increased slightly as incomes of poor households grew below average. Affected
households are not found primarily at the bottom, but rather in the middle of the income
distribution. Working hours of individuals and earnings of other members in households
affected by the minimum wage decreased. Benefit withdrawal is of minor importance
as welfare transfers and top-up benefits were only marginally reduced by the minimum
wage.
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1 Introduction
One central argument for the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany
was the rising income inequality. It has been argued that employees at the bottom
of the income distribution often require top up benefits to cover their daily expenses.
The fact that people who are in regular work cannot afford their basic standard of
living has been perceived as a particular injustice. That is why an explicit political
goal (renewed in the coalition agreement of the current government) is that employees
working full-time should under no circumstances depend on welfare transfers. As a
consequence the minimum wage was introduced to serve as a redistributive tool for
reducing inequality in earnings and income. To this date the empirical literature on the
distributional impact of the minimum wage in Germany either focuses on earnings and
hourly wages (Caliendo et al., 2017) only, or is based on ex ante simulation studies that
rely on assumptions like full compliance or no spillovers (Müller and Steiner, 2013;
Brenke and Müller, 2013).
This paper provides first empirical evidence on the distributional implications of
the German minimum wage on earnings and disposable household incomes. We ad-
dress a number of research questions that entail different policy implications for the
implementation and administration of minimum wages. Since a significant wage ef-
fect is a prerequisite for a pass-through to incomes, we investigate, first, the impact
of the minimum wage on wages with a particular focus on eligible employees at the
bottom of the distribution. Second, we analyze the impact of the minimum wage on
the distribution of disposable incomes: Can we confirm the results of previous simu-
lation studies, which found substantially smaller distributional effects on net incomes
than on gross wages? In this context we also investigate specific redistributive policy
goals: Did the minimum wage decrease prevalence and amount of top-up benefits (Auf-
stocker) and reduce the dependence on social welfare? Third, we gather evidence on
various underlying mechanisms that could explain the distributional consequences of
the minimum wage for household incomes beyond non-compliance and measurement
problems in the data. For this we investigate the position of low-wage earners across
the distribution of disposable household incomes, benefit withdrawal through the tax
and welfare system, changes in the structure and incidence of low wage employment
as well as adjustments in the working hours of affected employees.
There are no convincing control groups for the statutory minimum wage in Ger-
many (Allegretto et al., 2017; Neumark, 2018; Caliendo et al., 2018). Thus, we refrain
from a treatment/control group based research design and do not make strong causal
claims. We gather descriptive evidence about the actual situation of individuals and
households that were targeted by the reform by drawing a comprehensive distributional
picture for affected people and the entire population on the basis of different moments
of the hourly wage and household income distributions as well as various inequal-
ity measures. Based on the most recent distribution of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) we construct a consistent panel of individuals and households between
1
2012 and 2016. A particular focus is on people eligible for the minimum wage. We
systematically compare observational outcomes over time and investigate whether the
minimum wage introduction produced noticeable breaks in the data. For purposes of
comparison we also simulate two full compliance scenarios: one with the statutory
minimum wage level of 8.50e per hour and another with much higher level of 12e per
hour that has been repeatedly proclaimed by the Social Democratic Party and the labor
unions (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2018; Zeit Online, 2019). These simulations serve as
(ceteris paribus) upper-bound benchmarks for the full potential of the minimum wage
when we discuss changes in the incomes based on actual earnings.
In contrast to previous studies we determine “affected” employees and households
by their eligibility status and relative position in the hourly wage distribution. Eligibil-
ity depends on their employment state according to the minimum wage law. We define
those people as affected whose wage in a respective year belongs to the same share
of the wage distribution as the group of people who earned less than the introduction
minimum-wage-level prior to the reform.1 More precisely, we look at the bottom 11%
of employees that would be eligible for the minimum wage law. An advantage of this
approach is that it takes account of the high fluctuation at the bottom end of the wage
distribution and consistently focuses on the lowest wages.2 To calculate disposable
household incomes we use a tax-transfer-simulation-model (Steiner et al., 2012).
We find evidence for wage increases at the bottom end of the wage. However,
changes lie substantially below the potential of the minimum wage under full com-
pliance which points to implementation problems regarding compliance and measure-
ment of hourly wages. Moreover, the minimum wage proves to be a poor redistributive
tool with respect to disposable household income. Confirming ex-ante studies, we do
not find affected households benefiting much from the reform. Income inequality and
poverty even increased slightly in the years after the minimum wage introduction, since
disposable income at the bottom end grew much less than on average. This finding also
holds under full compliance and in a scenario with a markedly higher minimum wage
level. There is no evidence for significant employment losses or benefit withdrawal
induced by the minimum wage. The most important mechanisms for a limited pass-
through to low incomes is that low wage earners are spread over the income distribution
and face often very insecure employment conditions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses our con-
tribution to the distributional minimum wage literature. Section 3 sketches institu-
tional details of the German minimum wage. Section 4 informs about our data set
and methodological approach. Section 5 provides empirical results on wages, dispos-
able household incomes, and mechanisms behind the distributional effects (sub-section
5.3). Section 6 concludes.
1We take 2013 as a reference to avoid potential anticipation effects
2Tracking people based on their pre-reform wage would always lead to an upward bias of the overall
wage changes due to mean reversion. Other people, who were positioned outside the labor force or at a
higher position will have taken their positions within the overall wage distribution.
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2 Literature
The minimum wage literature has primarily been focused on the consequences for
employment (e.g. Neumark and Wascher, 2008; Neumark et al., 2014; Allegretto et al.,
2017; or Neumark, 2018). Besides evaluations of sectoral minimum wages (Möller,
2012), several papers for Germany do not find significant effects, or only small negative
short-run reductions in employment (Bellmann et al., 2016; Bossler and Gerner, 2016;
vom Berge et al., 2016; vom Berge and Frings, 2017; Bruttel et al., 2018; Caliendo
et al., 2018; Ahlfeldt et al., 2018). Some marginal jobs have been transformed into
regular employment (Garloff, 2017; Bachmann et al., 2017; vom Berge and Weber,
2017).
There is a general consensus in the literature on wages and earnings that a min-
imum wage is suited to mitigate inequalities at the bottom of the wage distribution.
Findings vary with respect to the magnitude of this effect (Autor et al., 2016; Dolton
et al., 2012; Stewart, 2012b,a; Autor et al., 2008; Neumark et al., 2004; Dickens and
Manning, 2004; Teulings, 2003; Lee, 1999; Machin, 1997; DiNardo et al., 1996). Em-
pirical studies on the question whether a minimum wage initiates spillovers further
up into the distribution reach mixed conclusions (Autor et al., 2016; Stewart, 2012b;
Dickens and Manning, 2004). Autor et al. (2016) point out that potential mecha-
nisms behind wage spillovers are not fully understood. Applications for Germany in-
clude Brautzsch and Schultz (2015), Amlinger et al. (2016), Mindestlohnkommission
(2016b), Caliendo et al. (2017), Bossler and Broszeit (2017), Bruttel et al. (2018), and
Ahlfeldt et al. (2018) who all confirm wage increases at the bottom of the distribution
for Germany. Another important finding is the significant degree of non-compliance.
Minimum wage research on the consequences for disposable incomes, income in-
equality, and poverty is based on equivalence-weighted incomes at the household level.
Redistributive effects are jointly determined by wage and employment changes as well
as other factors, e.g. product prices (Lemos, 2008) or interactions with the welfare
system (Freeman, 1996). First, (ex ante) simulation studies mimic certain adjustment
channels and estimate the consequences for the income distribution. The seminal paper
by Johnson and Browning (1983) incorporates interactions with the tax system and em-
ployment effects and finds a marginal redistributive impact of the U.S. minimum wage.
Burkhauser and co-authors show that the link between low household income and the
incidence of low wage employment in the U.S. has loosened (Burkhauser and Finegan,
1989; Burkhauser et al., 1996; Burkhauser and Sabia, 2007; Sabia and Burkhauser,
2010; Neumark, 2015). The minimum wage benefits workers in households above
the poverty line relatively more. Macurdy and McIntyre (2001) look at costs induced
by higher product prices: Although richer households bear most of the absolute bur-
den, poor households lose more in relative terms because of higher consumption rates.
Gosling (1996); Müller and Steiner (2009, 2013), and Campolieti et al. (2012) confirm
these findings for the UK, Germany, and Canada.
Second, regression approaches utilize (exogenous) variation in minimum wage
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regulations and estimate effects for various distributional indices, e.g. the incidence
or depth of poverty, without referring to particular adjustment mechanisms. Neumark
et al. (2005) estimate minimum wage effects on the whole income distribution with ker-
nel density estimators in a difference-in-difference framework and find an increase in
poverty. All other empirical ex-post studies utilize panel estimators based on regional
variation in federal or state-specific minimum wages over time. A sizable proportion
of those studies cannot identify significant effects on the reduction of poverty (Ved-
der and Gallaway, 2002; Neumark and Wascher, 2002; Burkhauser and Sabia, 2007;
Sabia, 2008; Sabia and Burkhauser, 2010; Sabia and Nielsen, 2013). Other studies find
moderate, yet statistically significant reductions for the incidence (Addison and Black-
burn, 1999; Morgan and Kickham, 2001; Stevans and Sessions, 2001; Gundersen and
Ziliak, 2004; DeFina, 2008; Sen et al., 2011) and depth of poverty (Dube, 2018) in the
U.S. Neumark et al. (2012) identify a slight poverty-reducing effect of city-wide living
wage laws.
Several papers investigate mechanisms that prevent a minimum wage from reach-
ing its redistributive potential, e.g. noncompliance (Brown, 1999; Metcalf, 2008; Min-
destlohnkommission, 2016b; Deutscher Bundestag, 2016a,c,b). General equilibrium
effects, such as reductions in employment or working hours (Stewart and Swaffield,
2008), are other mechanisms that (in the long-run) mitigate the inequality-reducing
effect of minimum wages (Neumark et al., 2004). Minimum wages can also affect
schooling (Neumark and Wascher, 1995), firms’ profits (Draca et al., 2013), consumer
prices (Aaronson and French, 2007), or on-the-job training (Neumark and Wascher,
2001) over the long haul. We draw on some of these mechanisms for the interpretation
of our results.
The assessment from the literature on disposable incomes is mixed. The over-
all redistributive impact of a minimum wage and the relevance of different factors
and mechanisms depend on the particular situation. Our study contributes to the dis-
tributional minimum wage research by providing first evidence for Germany. This
case is interesting as a federal minimum with significant bite is established within the
context of a comprehensive welfare state. We draw a multi-dimensional and compre-
hensive descriptive picture on the redistributive impact of the minimum wage looking
at hourly wages, earnings, and disposable household incomes. We establish a link
between different approaches by using simulated full-compliance scenarios as upper-
bound benchmarks for the interpretation of observational outcomes. Moreover we
investigate several potential mechanisms (e.g. the position of low wage earners in
the income distribution, benefit withdrawal, employment loss or changes, adjustment
of working hours and earnings of other household members) that influence the pass-
through of wage increases into disposable incomes.
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3 Minimum wage institutions in Germany
As codified by the German Minimum Wage Law, the statutory minimum wage of
8.50e per hour at the federal level came into effect on January 1st 2015 (Bruttel et al.,
2018). At that time a significant number of collectively agreed sectoral minimum
wages had already been put in place and were for many sectors still effective in 2015
and 2016. Examples are, among others, the main construction trade, the roofing sec-
tor, or commercial care services.3 The sector-specific minimum wages lie above the
federal minimum wage or were increased after the minimum wage reform (Amlinger
et al., 2016; Möller, 2012). The federal minimum wage is thus not binding in those
sectors.
The Minimum Wage Law decrees that the German Minimum Wage Commission
consists of employer and employee representatives as well as scientific advisors. Ad-
justments of the minimum wage level are solely negotiated and recommended by the
Minimum Wage Commission and then legally codified by the German parliament. As
of January 1 2017 the minimum wage was raised by 0.34e per hour (Mindestlohnkom-
mission, 2016a). Almost all employees in Germany fall under the legislation of the fed-
eral statutory gross minimum wage. During a transitional period that ended in January
2017 exemptions applied to certain sectors with pre-existing sector-specific minimum
wages. In addition, permanent exemptions are still in effect for persons below the age
of 18, trainees and interns (e.g., students or apprentices completing required or elective
internships of up to three months). Long-term unemployed (registered for at least 12
months) are allowed to be paid sub-minimum wages for up to six months. This ex-
ception does not play a significant role on the labor market, though (vom Berge et al.,
2016). The only exemptions that significantly reduce the number of employees eligible
for the minimum wage are trainees and minors. There are, thus, no ‘natural’ control
groups among regularly employed individuals to evaluate the impact of the minimum
wage.
The minimum wage is enforced by the German Customs Administration. It reg-
ularly conducts inspections of employer firms and enforces compliance with social
security laws and the Minimum Wage Law. In case of noncompliance penalties of up
to 500,000e can be imposed. However, not least because of personnel shortages due
to the refugee crisis enforcement was widely regarded as weak, especially in the first
year after the introduction of the minimum wage. For instance, legal proceedings were
only initiated in less than 2 out of 100 inspections with an average fine of about 275e
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2016c; Burauel et al., 2017).
3Some of those sector-specific minimum wages were replaced by the statutory minimum wage. As
of 1 January 2019 the full list in descending order by minimum wage levels varying from 17.25e per
hour to 9.49e per hour and for West and East Germany includes money transports, vocational education
and training services, skilled construction workers, commercial cleaning, painting (skilled workers),
chimney sweeping, roofing, unskilled construction workers, scaffolding, stonemasonry, electro trade,
elderly care, painting (unskilled workers), and temporary agency work (Amlinger et al., 2016).
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4 Data & methods
We are interested in the impact of the minimum wage on the overall distributions of
hourly wages and disposable household incomes. Notable exemptions from the statu-
tory minimum wage that would constitute ‘natural’ control groups do not exist. Using
the ‘regional bite’ for identification of distributional effects (see, e.g., Caliendo et al.,
2018) also entails a number of problematic assumptions. We therefore follow a basic,
descriptive approach that is more transparent. Our empirical analysis is focused on
changes in distributions, moments of these distributions, and synthetic distributional
measures over time. We check whether these outcomes change significantly after the
introduction of the minimum wage. First we use year-to-year changes before the min-
imum wage was implemented as reference. Second, we compare observed outcomes
with simulated outcomes under full compliance to the minimum wage. Third, we in-
vestigate specific sub-samples (balanced vs. unbalanced samples, only people affected
by the minimum wage) to shut down certain adjustment channels and learn more about
the mechanisms behind observed distributional changes over time.
Our empirical analysis is based on SOEP data (sub-section 4.1) and focused on el-
igible employees (sub-section 4.2). For this we carefully define the group of “affected"
employees and households by their eligibility status and their relative position in the
hourly wage distribution. Hourly wages are computed by dividing monthly earnings
by contractual hours (sub-section 4.3). Disposable household income is calculated on
the basis of a tax-transfer-simulation-model (sub-section 4.4). We assume full take-
up of benefits and also simulate a scenario where (ceteris paribus) all employers and
employees fully comply with minimum wage regulations.
4.1 Data
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a representative longitudinal household
study that started in 1984. As of 2015 it contains information of roughly 30,000 indi-
viduals living in about 15,000 households (Goebel et al., 2018; Wagner et al., 2007).
The SOEP provides detailed information on individuals’ labor market status, e.g. the
type of employment relationship of labor market participants, contractual and actual
weekly working hours, and monthly labor earnings. Earnings are distinguished for the
primary job and potential side jobs. Moreover, a wide range of individual and house-
hold characteristics is available that shed light on the economic and socio-demographic
background of the individuals in our samples. This allows us to analyze interactions
of the minimum wage with the tax and transfer system in Germany and to simulate
disposable incomes at the household level.
We use SOEP version 33.1.4 For specific variables, in particular for the labor
4See https://www.diw.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=diw_01.c.616136.en#615992, last ac-
cessed on 27 May, 2019.
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market status, we utilize the SOEP EVA-MIN data set. This is a specific data set that
provides information for evaluation purposes and tries to establish certain standards
for the preparation of the data to ensure the comparability of the results.5
4.2 Sample construction
Baseline sample
Since, the minimum wage is a policy for employees we focus on these individuals and
their households in our analysis. Individuals of the following labor market states are
included in our sample:
– full-time employees subject to social security contributions,
– part-time employees subject to social security contributions,
– marginally employed people (i.e. those individuals working in so-called mini jobs
that are exempted from employees’ social security contributions),
– civil servants.
Note that the self-employed and retirees are not eligible for the minimum wage and
thus not included in the sample of individuals. In the household sample we exclude
households with at least one household member aged over 65 to prevent our results
to be influenced by changes in the retirement benefits. For the main analysis we use
all sub-samples of the SOEP to keep the sample size roughly constant over time. Fre-
quency weights provided by SOEP are designed to ensure representativeness of the
descriptive results.
Over the course of the analysis period the SOEP started oversampling migrants. In
addition, overall weights for participants with migration background were adapted to
the marginal distribution of the German Microcensus in 2013. Thus, there are potential
breaks in the time series unrelated to substantive factors. In particular, we expect out-
comes for 2012 and 2013 to be not exactly comparable. Since migrants face different
labor market conditions and are over-proportionately affected by the minimum wage,
this could have an effect on our measures. Therefore, we provide robustness checks
where all observations without German citizenship are excluded.
Eligible employees & extreme wages
For the distributional analysis of wages we focus on individuals who were eligible for
the minimum wage, i.e. do not belong to exempted groups. There, we systematically
exclude individuals from our sample who belong to at least one of the specific groups
explicitly exempted from the minimum wage:
5See https://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.219247.en/research_advice/public_finances_
and_living_conditions/the_research_infrastucture_soep/research_projects/
research_projects.htmlid=diw_01.c.526464.en&skip=20?id=diw_01.c.496963.en for
further information, last accessed on 27 May, 2019.
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– workers aged under 18 without formal training,
– trainees and certain types of interns,
– long-term unemployed in the first 6 months of a new job and unemployed working,
– employees working in sectors where a tariff agreement regulating sector-specific
minimum wages below 8.50e per hour was already in place and is still in a given
post-reform year,
– retired individuals.
In order to cope with observations with extreme (and mostly implausible) values in our
sample, we censor the bottom and top percentile of the hourly wage, the total wage, and
the hours distribution by replacing the values below the bottom percentile and above
the top percentile with the threshold value of the respective percentile. This is in line
with the censoring procedure in other studies (see, e.g., Caliendo et al., 2018, 2017).6
Definition of people affected by the minimum wage
In most evaluation studies individuals “affected” by the minimum wage are defined as
those employees earning an hourly wage below the minimum wage threshold before
its introduction or increase.7 There is a substantial problem attached to this approach
that is rarely discussed in the literature. In the bottom parts of the wage distribution
there is a lot of year-to-year fluctuation between jobs. As a result hourly wages of low-
wage employees vary substantially between years even in the absence of any minimum
wage reforms. This fluctuation can be illustrated by looking at pre-reform years in
Germany. A significant share (more than 40%) of people working in a jobs paying
below the minimum wage in 2012 earn a wage above the minimum wage threshold in
the following year (Table 1). Even more than half of them get an hourly wage above
the minimum wage another year later.
Table 1: Employees with wages below 8.50e per hour in 2012 (only individuals eligi-
ble for the minimum wage)
Year Share with wage > 8.50e per hour CI Observations
2012 0.000 [0.000,0.000] 551
2013 0.424 [0.357,0.491] 551
2014 0.544 [0.478,0.609] 551
Notes: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2014; own calculations.
Aside from potential reporting error this pattern is in many instances also driven
by job changes. The share of transitions to a new job is particularly high in the lower
6Müller and Steiner (2013) or Brenke and Müller (2013), e.g. eliminated all observations with hourly
wages below 3 and above 150e per hour.
7Recent applications for Germany that follow this approach are, e.g., Caliendo et al. (2018, 2017) or
Bossler and Gerner (2016).
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deciles of the wage distribution: According to our sample 40% of employees in the bot-
tom decile and 35% of employees in the second decile changed jobs in a time interval
of four years before the minimum wage was introduced (Table 2).
Table 2: Share of job individuals that changed jobs by deciles of the hourly wage
distribution, years 2011-2014, pooled
Decile Share of job changes CI Observations
1 0.39 [0.36,0.41] 5,052
2 0.33 [0.31,0.35] 5,047
3 0.27 [0.25,0.29] 5,090
4 0.23 [0.21,0.25] 5,013
5 0.19 [0.17,0.20] 5,114
6 0.14 [0.13,0.16] 4,976
7 0.12 [0.11,0.14] 5,065
8 0.11 [0.10,0.13] 5,032
9 0.09 [0.08,0.10] 5,045
10 0.11 [0.09,0.12] 5,046
Notes: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2011-2014; own calculations.
Given those job fluctuations and variation in hourly wages that are not related to
the minimum wage, we do not use pre-reform work conditions to define our treatment
group. We define as being “affected” by the minimum wage those employees in a
certain range at the bottom of the hourly wage distribution who – according to their
employment status – are eligible for the minimum wage. The chosen range is deter-
mined by the share of eligible employees who earned less than 8.50e per hour prior
to the minimum wage reform. We take 2013 as the baseline year to avoid bias through
anticipation effects. In 2013 11% of eligible employees earned less than 8.50e. There-
fore, we denote the group of employed people who are eligible for the minimum wage
and belong to the bottom 11% of the hourly wage distribution of a respective year
as affected. That way our analysis consistently focuses on those employees with the
lowest earnings in a given year and therefore exactly those individuals who have been
targeted by the minimum wage reform.
4.3 Measurement of hourly wages
It is crucial for the empirical analysis how hourly wages are defined. The SOEP ques-
tionaire does not contain a direct query on hourly wages. Yet, respondents are asked
questions, both, about their monthly earnings as well as their contractual and actual
weekly hours of work. Based on this information different concepts of hourly wages
can be computed (see, e.g., Brenke and Müller, 2013, Caliendo et al., 2017, or Dütsch
et al., 2017), where monthly labor earnings are simply divided by weekly working
hours extrapolated to a monthly figure.
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We employ the arguably most reliable measure based on contractual working
hours that are fixed in the contract the employee signed and do not fluctuate or change
in the short-run. Although a minimum wage policy intends that employee’s receive
the minimum wage for all the hours they work, which would be represented by actual
working hours in the SOEP, there are problems attached to this wage concept. Actual
working hours are more likely to suffer from measurement error, item non-response,
and strong fluctuations and therefore lack precision. Moreover, wages and overtime
hours do not have the same reference month in the survey. However, we must keep in
mind that many employees supply unpaid overtime hours, which might have increased
due to the minimum wage reform. The wage measure based on contractual hours thus
represents an upper bound for hourly wages.
4.4 Simulated outcomes
Full compliance scenario
To get a benchmark for the redistributive effects of the minimum wage reform under
full compliance, we simulate a basic ceteris paribus scenario: All observed hourly
wages below 8.50e are lifted to this threshold in post-reform years. Wages above the
minimum wage level and other variables remain unchanged. We abstract from wage
spillovers and employment effects. Hence, this scenario serves as an upper bound
for the distributional impact of the minimum-wage on wages and income under full
compliance. We repeat this exercise for a high-minimum wage scenario of 12.00e.
Simulation of household incomes
Of primary interest is whether the minimum wage reached its goal of improving the
living standard of low wage earners as measured by disposable household incomes.
Therefore, we consider interactions of the minimum wage with the German tax and
transfer system on the basis of a microsimulation model (Steiner et al., 2012 ). The
model contains the main features of the German tax and transfer system. Gross house-
hold income is composed of earnings from dependent employment, income from capi-
tal, property rents and other income. Earnings from dependent employment is the most
important income component for the great majority of households.
Taxable income is calculated by deducting various expenses from gross house-
hold income and considering joint income taxation for couples. For married spouses,
income is taxed jointly based on an income splitting factor of 2. Employees’ social
security contributions and the income tax are deducted from gross household income
and social transfers are added to get net household income. Social transfers include
child allowances, child-rearing benefits, educational allowances for students and ap-
prentices, unemployment compensation, the housing allowance, and social assistance.
All household incomes are equivalence weighted.
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5 Empirical findings
A necessary condition to achieve income redistribution is that the minimum wage has
a significant impact on the distribution of gross hourly wages. Therefore our empir-
ical analysis starts with individual wage effects (sub-section 5.1). We then turn to
the household level and analyze disposable household incomes and related distribu-
tional measures (sub-section 5.2). We consider income changes at different quantiles,
various distributional measures, and specific redistributive policy goals like welfare
dependence and top-up benefits. Finally, we look more into mechanisms behind the
distributional effects of the minimum wage (sub-section 5.3).
5.1 Wage effects
To start the descriptive analysis of wage effects we look at wage distributions of indi-
viduals who are eligible for the minimum wage in the time interval between 2012 and
2016 (Figure 1). There is a small shift to the right of the distributions for all pre-reform
years, but after the minimum wage was introduced one can see a distinctly larger in-
crease in wages at the bottom of the distribution for 2015. This increase is persistent
in 2016 and continues to shift to the right in the magnitude of the pre-reform years.
At the same time, a lot of probability mass remains to the left of the minimum wage
threshold of 8.50e per hour (horizontal line) even in 2016. The picture is similar for
unweighted distributions (Figure A1 in the Appendix).
Figure 1: Distributions of hourly wages, all eligible employees, 2012-2016
Notes: The vertical line depicts the minimum wage level of 8.50e per hour.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; weighted; own calculations.
When zooming in on people affected by the minimum wage in the lower parts
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of the distribution, this difference becomes more clearly visible (Figure 2). The spike
shifts to the right in 2015 and becomes even more pronounced in 2016. The result pat-
tern is similar when we consider unweighted distributions (Figure A2 in the Appendix)
and wages below the 20th quantile (Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix) for robustness
purposes. We do not find systematic changes in contractual working hours of affected
employees (Figure A5 in the Appendix).
Figure 2: Distributions of hourly wages, eligible employees affected by the minimum
wage: hourly wages below the 11th quantile of the yearly hourly wage dis-
tribution, 2012-2016
Notes: The vertical line depicts the minimum wage level of 8.50e per hour.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; weighted; own calculations.
A number of points can be taken away from this descriptive analysis of wage
distributions: First, (nominal) wage growth occurs in all years of our sample. Second,
a clear minimum wage effect becomes visible in density graphs for 2015 and 2016 that
is hardly within the range of ordinary wage growth. Third, there is a lot of probability
mass still below 8.50 threshold in those graphs for the years after the introduction of
the minimum wage. This indicates non-compliance during the implementation of the
minimum wage, potentially to a considerable extent (see also Caliendo et al., 2017).
This also points to the above-mentioned measurement issues of reporting errors and
inconsistencies in the data.
A detailed look at the share of employees in our data who receive wages below the
minimum wage helps to shed light on these issues (Table 3). We analyze unbalanced
and balanced panels of all and eligible employees to rule out that results are driven by
compositional changes. Minimum wage induced job losses would also decrease the
share of employees with sub-minimum wages. Note, that the balanced sample consists
of individuals with an observed wage in all years. People moving out of employment
12
in any period are excluded. Therefore the balanced sample is not representative.
Table 3: Share of employees with hourly wages below 8.50e per hour in %
Year Unbalanced panel Balanced panel
All CI Eligible CI All CI Eligible CI
2012 9.2 [8.7;9.7] 10.3 [9.8;10.9] 6.1 [5.4;6.8] 5.9 [5.2;6.7]
2013 9.2 [8.7;9.6] 10.4 [9.9;11.0] 5.5 [4.9;6.2] 4.8 [4.1;5.5]
2014 8.8 [8.3;9.3] 10.1 [9.5;10.6] 4.3 [3.7;4.9] 3.7 [3.1;4.3]
2015 6.6 [6.1;7.0] 7.5 [7.0;8.0] 2.6 [2.1;3.0] 2.1 [1.6;2.6]
2016 6.1 [5.7;6.6] 6.9 [6.4;7.4] 2.7 [2.2;3.2] 2.1 [1.7;2.6 ]
N 60,545 53,143 22,055 19,175
Notes: The balanced panel contains 4411 observations per year and 3835 for those eligible throughout
this time. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Since employment changes are more frequent at the bottom of the wage distri-
bution, the balanced panel contains more individuals who earn higher wages which
explains the smaller shares of individuals with sub-minimum wages. Nevertheless, the
trends in the balanced and unbalanced panels are very similar. The share of employees
below the threshold is decreasing over time with a particularly strong and significant
decrease in 2015 that is persistent in 2016 (Table 3). However, the share remains
markedly positive in 2015 (6.6% in the unbalanced and 2.6% in the balanced sample).
In 2016 this number drops only slightly in the unbalanced samples. This confirms the
first impressions from the distributional graphs. It remains unclear to what degree this
is a measurement or compliance problem. Evidence on insufficient enforcement of the
minimum wage suggest that non-compliance was a significant factor (Caliendo et al.,
2017). These findings are robust without weights and for the sub-sample of employees
with German citizenship (Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix).
We now quantify wage changes over the distribution and analyze the distributional
effects of the minimum wage based on a sample of individuals eligible for the mini-
mum wage. We introduce a simulated full compliance scenario as a benchmark that –
ceteris paribus – constitutes an upper bound for wage redistribution. First, we analyze
specific quantiles. In 2015 there is a small and significant increase in 5th and 10th per-
centiles as well as for the median (not in the the 1st percentile). However, changes are
small and remain under the minimum wage threshold for the 1st and 5th percentile, as
the full compliance scenario illustrates (Table 4). A markedly higher minimum wage
level of 12.00e per hour and full compliance would also have an effect on the 10th
percentile. These findings are largely robust without weights and for the sub-sample
of German nationals (Tables A3 and in A4 the Appendix).
Second, we consider the Atkinson inequality measure, the poverty rate, and other
poverty measures from the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class with different weight-
ing parameters (see Cowell 2000, Table 5). In 2014 there is a marked increase in
inequality, in particular at the bottom of the distribution. Leaving aside measurement
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Table 4: Percentiles of the hourly wage distribution, only eligible employees
Year Percentiles Median
P1 P5 P10
CI CI CI CI
2012 4.66 [4.20;4.72] 7.11 [6.98;7.32] 8.45 [8.28;8.63] 15.17 [14.98;15.54]
2013 4.72 [4.28;4.95] 7.08 [6.98;7.27] 8.43 [8.18;8.64] 15.15 [14.95;15.44]
2014 4.72 [4.48;4.81] 7.13 [6.99;7.26] 8.51 [8.26;8.64] 15.69 [15.34;15.95]
2015 4.72 [4.22;5.31] 7.72 [7.51;7.99] 9.01 [8.77;9.20] 16.33 [16.07;16.61]
2016 5.31 [5.07;5.91] 8.12 [7.97;8.32] 9.11 [8.99;9.32] 16.32 [15.95;16.66]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 8.50 8.50 9.01 [8.78;9.20] 16.33 [16.05;16.68]
2016 8.50 8.50 9.11 [8.99;9.27] 16.32 [15.96;16.73]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 12.00 12.00 12.00 16.33 [16.06;16.66]
2016 12.00 12.00 12.00 16.32 [15.95;16.67]
Notes: Individual frequency weights used. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
issues this finding clearly goes against anticipation effects. According to the Atkinson
index inequality does not change significantly in the years after the reform. Under
full compliance we would have observed a significant decrease in wage inequality that
would be more pronounced under a high minimum wage – as long as potential em-
ployment effects can be ignored (Table 5).
Table 5: Inequality measures, poverty measures for hourly wages, only eligible em-
ployees
Year Inequality Poverty measures
Atkinson Poverty rate Poverty gap FGT(2)
CI CI CI CI
2012 0.20 [0.19;0.21] 13.10 [12.23;14.35] 2.73 [2.50;3.03] 0.94 [0.85;1.08]
2013 0.20 [0.19;0.21] 13.15 [12.33;14.09] 2.70 [2.46;2.99] 0.90 [0.79;1.06]
2014 0.21 [0.20;0.22] 15.39 [14.15;16.62] 3.04 [2.76;3.32] 1.02 [0.89;1.14]
2015 0.20 [0.19;0.21] 13.62 [12.57;14.64] 2.70 [2.41;2.99] 0.89 [0.76;1.03]
2016 0.19 [0.18;0.21] 14.21 [12.95;15.45] 2.36 [2.09;2.64] 0.72 [0.59;0.84]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 0.17 [0.16;0.18] 13.62 [12.58;14.81] 1.41 [1.28;1.52] 0.17 [0.15;0.18]
2016 0.17 [0.16;0.18] 14.21 [13.04;15.22] 1.35 [1.24;1.47] 0.16 [0.14;0.17]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 0.13 [0.12;0.14] 0.00 0.00 0.00
2016 0.13 [0.12,0.13] 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Individual frequency weights used. Poverty line at 60% of median wage. FGT(2) and FGT(3)
denote FGT (α) = 1n ∑
q
i=1
( z−yi
z
)α
for z := poverty line and q := number of poor, with α= 2 and α= 3
respectively. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
The minimum wage did not significantly reduce the poverty rate based on the
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distribution of hourly wages because the poverty line was above the minimum wage
level. Therefore results for the full compliance scenario are similar. A high mini-
mum wage of 12.00e per hour would lift wages of all employed persons above the
poverty line (Table 5). Yet, the federal minimum was able to reduce the distance to the
poverty line (poverty gap) for the lowest quantiles of the distribution. We find a sig-
nificant reduction in the poverty gap and the FGT(2) measure after the minimum wage
became effective in 2015. A comparison with the simulated full compliance scenario
shows that the minimum wage has by far not reached its full potential in reducing wage
inequality at the bottom of the distribution. The simulated reduction under full compli-
ance is substantially larger than for the observed outcomes (Table 5). These findings
are also robust when we repeat the analysis without weights and for the sub-sample of
German nationals (Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix).
5.2 Income effects
We now turn to the question whether the minimum wage improved the situation of
low income households and whether the redistributive impact could be significantly
higher under full compliance. We calculate disposable household incomes based on
microsimulation model. Again, changes over time before and after the introduction
of the minimum wage are compared with potential changes under full compliance and
for a scenario with a substantially higher minimum wage of 12.00e per hour. Similar
to the wage analysis we investigate moments of the income distribution and various
distributional measures. In addition, we look at specific minimum wage goals.
Average effects
Aside from generic income growth, we do not find significant changes in the lower
percentiles of the disposable income distribution for households with at least one indi-
vidual eligible to the minimum wage (Table 6). The only significant increase occurs
for mean and median incomes in 2016. This can hardly be driven by the minimum
wage introduction. Results for the simulated full compliance scenario indicate that the
potential redistributive effect of the minimum wage is not much higher. Neither lower
quantiles nor the mean or median of the household income distribution would be lifted
significantly. Interestingly, households in the middle of the income distribution would
profit more than households at the bottom from a markedly higher minimum wage of
12.00e per hour (Table 6, lower panel). These findings remain robust with unweighted
data and a sub-sample of German nationals (Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix).
Distributional effects
Turning to inequality and poverty measures for the income distribution of households
observed between 2012 and 2016 largely confirms these findings (Table 7). With flex-
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Table 6: Percentiles of monthly disposable household equivalence income in e
Year P5 P10 Mean Median N
CI CI CI CI
2012 627 [605;644] 714 [695;732] 1818 [1769;1876] 1491 [1459;1525] 11,305
2013 636 [626;648] 716 [705;733] 1850 [1808;1898] 1497 [1465;1528] 12,552
2014 664 [650;672] 735 [721;753] 1913 [1862;1972] 1547 [1504;1585] 10,767
2015 657 [634;672] 749 [728;768] 1937 [1881;2004] 1575 [1534;1610] 10,559
2016 658 [643;669] 754 [730;776] 2136 [2061;2223] 1676 [1637;1729] 10,201
2015 659 [639;675] 751 [732;771] 1944 [1887;2002] 1585 [1544;1617] 10,559
2016 658 [647;671] 760 [734;784] 2140 [2064;2224] 1685 [1645;1731] 10,201
2015 662 [639;673] 756 [729;772] 1966 [1910;2021] 1616 [1582;1647] 10,559
2016 659 [648;673] 766 [734;786] 2160 [2086;2257] 1714 [1669;1754] 10,201
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale Household frequency weights by SOEP.
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; all samples included, own calculations.
ible poverty lines for each year poverty increases. Post-reform average and median
income growth was higher than for the bottom end of the distribution, especially in
2016. Under full compliance this pattern would have changed only slightly. Overall
inequality is not reduced and the poverty measures decrease only mildly in this sce-
nario. Drastically increasing the minimum wage level would not help: Some poverty
measures would even increase as the poverty line would also be lifted (Table 7, lower
panel).
Table 7: Inequality and poverty measures of net household income
Year Inequality Poverty measures
Atkinson Poverty rate Poverty gap FGT(2) Poverty
CI CI CI CI line
2012 0.54 [0.44;0.64] 20.7 [19.6;21.5] 5.0 [4.6;5.5] 2.2 [1.9;2.5] 894.3
2013 0.45 [0.40;0.49] 21.0 [19.7;22.2] 4.9 [4.5;5.3] 2.0 [1.8;2.3] 898.5
2014 0.52 [0.46;0.57] 21.0 [19.3;22.3] 5.0 [4.6;5.5] 2.2 [1.9;2.5] 928.2
2015 0.48 [0.43;0.53] 22.4 [20.8;23.6] 5.3 [4.7;5.7] 2.2 [1.9;2.6] 945.2
2016 0.51 [0.45;0.57] 23.4 [22.3;24.9] 5.9 [5.5;6.5] 2.5 [2.2;2.8] 1005.9
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 0.47 [0.41;0.53] 21.8 [20.1;22.7] 5.2 [4.7;5.6] 2.2 [1.9;2.5] 951.0
2016 0.51 [0.46;0.57] 23.2 [21.9;24.5] 5.9 [5.4;6.4] 2.5 [2.1;2.8] 1010.9
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 0.47 [0.42;0.53] 21.9 [20.8;23.2] 5.4 [4.9;5.9] 2.3 [2.0;2.6] 969.9
2016 0.51 [0.45;0.57] 23.5 [22.1;24.6] 6.0 [5.5;6.5] 2.5 [2.2;2.9] 1028.5
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale. Household frequency weights by SOEP.
Poverty rate determined by year. FGT (α) = 1n ∑
q
i=1
( z−yi
z
)α
for z := poverty line and q := number of
poor, with α= 2 and α= 3 respectively. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Poverty intensity also rose in the observed data in 2016. The main reason is that
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the poverty line increased significantly together with the higher parts of the income
distribution (Table 7). If the poverty line is held fix to 2014 levels we such an increase
cannot be observed (Table A9 in the Appendix). Results based on a fixed poverty
line confirm that the maximum redistributive impact of the minimum wage under full
compliance would be limited. Hence, in absolute terms households are not worse
off, but relative inequality and poverty slightly increased after the introduction of the
minimum wage.
Do we find similar patterns when we focus the distributional analysis on house-
holds that are directly affected by the minimum wage? We restrict the sample to house-
holds where at least one employee earns a hourly wage below the 11th quantile of the
wage distribution and analyze poverty for the group of affected households. Mean and
median incomes increase in 2016 (Table 8). This is most likely not driven by the min-
imum wage as we observed a similar trend for the sample of all eligible households.
We find a strong increase in the poverty rate and poverty gap in 2015, even more so in
2016 for households affected directly by the minimum wage.8 Successive increases in
the poverty lines drive this effect. The minimum wage with full compliance would be
able to counteract this trend for the group of affected households. Similarly, lifting the
minimum wage to 12.00e per hour further decreases poverty for the group of affected
households (Table 8, lower panel). Yet, even for affected household and under full
compliance with a 12.00e minimum wage reductions in relative poverty are limited.
This underlines that one important reason that the minimum wage does not signifi-
cantly reduce overall poverty (Table 7 above) is that many low income households are
not affected by the minimum wage. All aforementioned distributional results can be
reproduced when no weights are applied or a sub-sample of German nationals is used
(Tables A10 to A14 in the Appendix).
Specific minimum wage objectives
Policymakers often state that reducing the dependence on welfare transfers and top-up
benefits in addition to labor earnings are primary policy goals of a minimum wage.
The simulation results of this paper on transfer income point to a decrease, albeit only
to minor reductions in welfare dependency. The share of individuals that are eligible
for top-up benefits in our model decreases from 11.3% in 2014 to 10.8% in 2015 and
10.5% in 2016 (Table 9). Under full compliance the reduction would be more distinct
and statistically significant. A high minimum wage of 12.00e per hour would ceteris
paribus further reduce the share to less than 9% assuming employees do not become
unemployed and welfare-dependent. Based on simulated eligibility the minimum wage
is able to somewhat reduce the number of employees receiving top-up benefits. How-
ever, it is not very effective as the relatively small reduction for a high minimum wage
level shows.
We do not find a similar reduction for average per capita social assistance transfers
8We use the poverty lines of the unrestricted overall distribution here (see Table 7).
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Table 9: Top-up benefits and welfare receipt
Year Eligible for top-up Social assistance transfer e per year
benefits (%) stated
CI eligibility CI take-up CI
2012 10.7 [9.8;11.5] 1974.3 [1866.9;2092.8] 725.2 [669.2;793.7]
2013 11.3 [10.4;12.1] 2175.6 [2056.0;2283.1] 795.3 [724.3;866.1]
2014 11.3 [10.4;12.2] 2075.5 [1969.1;2207.2] 826.5 [750.7;910.6]
2015 10.8 [10.0;11.8] 2186.5 [2055.3;2308.7] 801.4 [722.4;880.4]
2016 10.5 [9.5;11.4] 2122.8 [1988.6;2248.3] 871.7 [793.3;969.2]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 10.0 [9.1;10.8] 2102.4 [1981.0;2235.0]
2016 10.0 [9.1;11.0] 2064.3 [1936.2;2188.2]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 8.7 [7.9;9.6] 2005.0 [1884.7;2139.4]
2016 8.9 [8.1;9.8] 1976.5 [1859.8;2116.5]
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale. Household frequency weights used.
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2015; own calculations.
that are simulated on the basis of observed earnings in the post-reform years. Social
assistance even increased in 2015. This seems to be in the realm of yearly fluctua-
tions as the time series for the pre-reform years shows (Table 9). There is, however, a
moderate reduction in the amount of social assistance transfers under full compliance.
The effects become larger under a high minimum wage of 12.00e per hour. Overall,
this confirms the findings for top-up benefits. The minimum wage is able to reduce
welfare dependence, but is not a very effective policy tool in this regard. Results can
be reproduced without weights and the sub-sample of German nationals (Tables A15
and A16 in the Appendix).
Our simulations represent benefit eligibility only. Eligibility is a valid indicator
for the actual neediness of households. This is what policymakers should be concerned
with. Whether those benefits are actually taken up is a different story (Bruckmeier
et al., 2014). Figures based on stated take-up from the SOEP show a positive trend be-
tween 2012 and 2016 (Table 9). There is a small, albeit insignificant, dip in 2015 after
the minimum wage introduction. We complement this part of the analysis with admin-
istrative statistics on welfare receipt and top-up benefits (Figure 3). The unsmoothed
monthly time series exhibit longer, business cycle related trends and seasonal patterns.
There are no visible breaks after the minimum wage introduction in 2015 (depicted by
the vertical line in the graph), neither in overall unemployment assistance benefit re-
ceipt, nor in the receipt of top-up benefits. This confirms our findings that the minimum
wage had at best only a marginal effect on the reduction of top-up benefits and over-
all welfare receipt (see also Bruckmeier and Wiemers, 2015; Mindestlohnkommission,
2016b).
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Figure 3: Employable welfare recipients, top-up benefits, and unemployment assis-
tance benefits, 2005-2018
Notes: The vertical line depicts the minimum wage introduction in 2015; total UB II benefits in 1000e.
Source: Federal employment agency, monthly data 2005-2018; own calculations.
5.3 Mechanisms
Which mechanisms are behind the negligible impact the minimum wage has on the
income distribution? We showed that there is a small reduction in welfare receipt for
affected individuals and households. However, a substitution of welfare transfers by
higher wages does not seem to be a dominant factor as the time series of administrative
statistics on unemployment assistance benefits that are smooth around the minimum
wage introduction indicate. We therefore investigate alternative channels that are re-
sponsible for a limited pass-through of wage increases to disposable incomes. First,
we analyze the distribution of affected individuals and income changes across dispos-
able household incomes. Second, we check whether whether the employment structure
of affected individuals changes. Third, we analyze whether higher wages of affected
individuals lead to labor supply adjustments of other household members by tracking
the group of individuals with sub-minimum wages in 2014 over time.
Affected individuals over the distribution of disposable household incomes
The highest share of households with at least one employee affected9 by the minimum
wage varies around 20% and can be found in the third decile of the household income
distribution (Table 10).
9We use the definition from above and take employees in the bottom 11% of the hourly wage distri-
bution of any given year as being affected by the minimum wage (sub-section 4.2 above).
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The share is less than half the size in the second and almost negligible in the first
decile. On the other hand, shares of affected households vary between 10% and 20%
up in the 4th and 5th deciles and still reach roughly 10% in the 6th and even in the
7th decile. This distribution of affected households is stable over time and consistent
with the distributional minimum wage literature. Previous studies for various countries
point out that the correlation between gross hourly wages and disposable household in-
comes is limited (Neumark, 2015; Müller and Steiner, 2013; Burkhauser and Finegan,
1989; Johnson and Browning, 1983). Low-wage employees often provide only the sec-
ondary wage earnings to overall household incomes. Various types of welfare transfers
can also contribute to this weak relationship between the hourly wage and net income
distributions. In terms of average income changes no clear picture emerges for affected
households when compared to all households across deciles of the household income
distribution. The pattern of income changes among affected households is relatively
similar to overall changes by deciles. The marked increase in household incomes be-
tween 2015 and 2016, i.e. in the second year after the introduction of the minimum
wage, is particularly driven by all deciles above the median.
Changes in the employment structure of affected individuals
Changes in the employment structure of affected individuals are another potential
mechanism that determines the degree of pass-through of wage adjustments to house-
hold incomes. This could be part of the explanation why increases in gross earnings
do not show in incomes of those households affected by the minimum wage. Adjust-
ments in the employment structure are rather small overall. We observe a decrease
in marginal and an increase in part-time employment as well as a slight increase in
median working hours in 2015, partially also in 2016 (Table11).10 These changes are
consistent with previous evidence pointing towards some transformation of marginal
jobs into part-time employment (Garloff, 2016, 2017; Bachmann et al., 2017; vom
Berge and Weber, 2017).
Large shares of low-wage employees work in the trade, service, and manufac-
turing sectors. The only persistent changes in sector shares after the minimum-wage
introduction are an increase in the construction sector and a decrease in the manu-
facturing, and maybe in the energy and banking sectors among the bottom 11% of
employees. Results are similar without using weights (Table A20 in the Appendix).
Tracking of affected individuals over time
We discussed the considerable volatility in employment conditions at the bottom of the
hourly wage distribution (sub-section 4.2 above). This is one important reason why we
10Being conditional on employment, these results do not contradict negative employment effects
found by other papers (Bossler and Gerner, 2016; vom Berge et al., 2016; vom Berge and Frings, 2017).
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Table 11: Eligible individuals in the bottom 11% of the hourly wage distribution
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Threshold wage in e 8.74 8.67 8.86 9.31 9.47
Employment categories in %
- full time 55.11 54.60 50.62 53.75 51.22
- part time 17.28 18.10 17.55 19.81 23.95
- marginal 25.42 25.33 28.88 23.74 23.19
Contractual working hours per week
- mean 29.74 29.53 28.41 29.19 28.28
- median 33.46 32.00 29.54 31.54 30.46
Sectors (in %)
Agriculture 1.22 1.70 1.36 1.70 0.32
Energy 0.34 0.43 0.28 0.21 0.06
Manufacturing 15.00 14.72 11.51 12.76 12.84
Construction 4.83 5.77 3.99 4.18 6.68
Trade 27.62 32.48 29.65 32.50 28.9
Transport 5.13 4.63 4.32 4.25 4.62
Bank, Insurance 1.01 1.16 0.97 0.98 0.55
Services 38.75 38.60 38.74 40.16 35.55
Observations 1400 1559 1397 1345 1222
Notes: Affected individuals: bottom 11% of the hourly wage distribution – reference: share of individ-
uals who earned less than 8.50e per hour in 2013.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016, all samples included, weighted by individual frequency weights; own
calculations.
refrain from defining treatment and control groups solely based on individuals’ pre-
reform labor market status and wage. Yet, the possibility of tracking people over time
is a valuable feature of our panel data for gaining insight into the dynamics of working
conditions at the bottom of the wage distribution. First, we follow employees over
post-reform years 2015 and 2016 that earned less than 8.50e per hour in the year 2014
before the minimum wage was introduced. Then we repeat the exercise for 2012 as a
‘placebo test’ and track individuals through 2013 and 2014 before the minimum wage
was introduced.
Individuals with wages below 8.50e per hour in 2014 For this exercise we no
longer consider “affected” individuals as defined above (sub-section 4.2), since we
need a balanced panel. We therefore consider employees who received wages below
8.50e per hour in their main job in 2014, the year before the minimum wage introduc-
tion.11 The first sample considered includes individuals that are at least observed in
11They are not necessarily actually affected for the reasons pointed out above, e.g. if they change to
a new job in 2015 that is not affected by the reform.
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2014 and 2015. The second sample includes a balanced panel of individuals who are
observed between 2014 and 2016. Figures from the first column that are based on all
individuals who had wages below 8.50e per hour in 2014 underline that panel attrition
in balanced panels is not selective in terms of wages and contractual hours. We do
not use weights in the balanced sample to rule out disproportionately high weights on
single observations in these small samples. Between 2014 and 2015 we observe 786
individuals with a share of 76% women with one fourth becoming unemployed (Ta-
ble 12). The share of non-employed people is similar in the sample observed between
2014 and 2016. Among the employed only about 71% keep their job between 2014
and 2015 and about 66% between 2014 and 2016.
Table 12: Eligible individuals earning less than 8.50e per hour in 2014
Reference Observed 2014-2015 Observed 2014-2016
Year 2014 2014 2015 2014 2015 2016
Observations 928 786 786 638 638 638
Female 694 593 593 478 478 478
(75%) (76%) (76%) (75%) (75%) (75%)
Average wages 821.5 e 808.7 e 830.5 e 817.9e 839.8 e 962.0 e
Not employed – – 196 – 162 153
– – (25%) – (25%) (24%)
Employed 928 590 590 410 410 410
(balanced) (75%) (75%) (64%) (64%) (64%)
– Average wages 821.5 e 849.6 e 1062.7e 886.2 e 1114.1 e 1256.9e
– Contractual hours1 27.6 28.1 27.5 29.1 28.7 28.3
– Hourly wages 6.8 e 6.9 e 9.1 e 6.9 e 9.3 e 10.9 e
Employed in same – 420 420 271 271 271
job (balanced) – (71%) (71%) (66%) (66%) (66%)
– Average wages – 821.5 e 874.3 e 912.3e 1084.7 e 1173.1 e
– Contractual hours1 – 28.4 27.1 29.7 28.2 27.7
– Hourly wages – 7.0 8.9 e 7.0 9.2 e 10.3 e
Same job and – – 273 2 – 200 208 3
wage increased – – (65%) 2 – (73%) (76% )3
– Wages others – – -92.8 e – -150.2 e -85.5 e
Notes: Individuals affected with an hourly wage below the minimum wage level of 8.50e per hour
in 2014 are tracked. In 2014 all observations are employed by construction of the sample. Small
numbers of observations are a result of sample restrictions and panel attrition. Individuals without
German citizenship excluded (to allow for better comparison with the placebo). 1 Contractual hours per
week. 2 Among those who stayed in the same job. 3 Change in total monthly wage wrt. 2014 wages
among those who kept the same job since 2014.
Source: SOEP, waves 2014-2016; own calculations.
Both groups, employees and job stayers, experienced substantial wage increases
between 2014 and 2015 that continued, to a lesser degree, in 2016. Wage increases
are markedly higher for all employed than for job stayers on average and on an hourly
basis. Job-to-job transitions are guided by wages (Bagger and Lentz, 2018). More-
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over, we find a reduction in contractual working hours between 2014 and 2015 for all
employees that continues in 2016 and is more pronounced for job stayers. Together
those changes result in an average wage increase for the whole sample, although 25%
of the sample are not employed. In those households with individuals that kept their
job and received a wage raise, other household members decreased their average total
wage earnings in 2015 and, to a lesser degree, also in 2016 (Table 12).
Individuals with wages below 8.50e per hour in 2012 (‘placebo test’) These year-
to-year changes are not necessarily driven by the minimum wage, but can also result
from regular fluctuation and dynamics on the labor market. Therefore, we repeat the
tracking exercise starting in 2012 and follow individuals over pre-reform years. This
‘placebo test’ is used as reference point for a more nuanced interpretation of our find-
ings in terms of potential minimum wage effects (Table 13).
Table 13: Eligible individuals earning less than 8.50e per hour in 2012
Reference Observed 2012-2013 Observed 2012-2014
Year 2012 2012 2013 2012 2013 2014
Observations 1131 944 944 790 790 790
Female 833 702 702 589 589 589
(73.7%) ( 74.4%) (74.4 %) (74.6 %) (74.6 %) (74.6 %)
Average wages 827.2e 820.8 e 816.6 e 822.4 e 802.8 e 868.8e
Not employed – – 244 – 206 215
– – (26%) – (26%) (27%)
Employed (balanced) 1,131 700 700 487 487 487
– Average wages 827.6 e 870.3 e 1040.0 e 885.1 e 1055.9 e 1165.9 e
– Contractual hours1 28.3 29.2 28.9 29.4 29.4 29.2
– Hourly wages 6.7 e 6.8 e 8.5 e 6.9 e 8.4 e 9.4 e
Employed in same job2 – 532 532 334 334 334
– (78%) (78%) ( 69% ( 69%) (69%)
– Average wages – 886.6 979.0 e 907.5 e 1009.8 e 1068.6 e
– Contractual hours1 – 29.2 28.4 29.7 28.9 28.9
– Hourly wages – 6.9 8.1 e 7.0 8.2e 8.8 e
Same job and wage – – 293 – 209 227 3
increased – – (55%) – (63%) (68%) 3
– Wages others – – 6.8 e – 71.8 e 227.7 e
Notes: Individuals affected with an hourly wage below the minimum wage level of 8.50e per hour
in 2012 are tracked. In 2012 all observations are employed by construction of the sample. Small
numbers of observations are a result of sample restrictions and panel attrition. Individuals without
German citizenship excluded (to allow for better comparison with the placebo). 1 Contractual hours per
week. 2 Among those who stayed in the same job. 3 Change in total monthly wage wrt. 2012 wages
among those who kept the same job since 2012.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2014; own calculations.
The basic patterns for the pre-reform period are similar to the years around the
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minimum wage introduction. The total number of individuals below 8.50e per hour is
higher because of generic wage growth over time. The share of people who lose their
job from 2012 to 2014 is between 26% and 27% and thus slightly higher compared
to the post-reform period. Employment volatility is a general problem of low-wage
earners. This comparison does not indicate that the minimum wage had substantial
negative employment effects. We reiterate the descriptive nature of this evidence as
we do not account for other factors determining low-wage employment, most notably
business cycle fluctuations. Yet, both tables underline that job-insecurity and non-
employment is an important driver of poverty for people at the bottom of the wage
distribution.
There is, however, a marked difference in the growth of average and hourly wages.
In addition to the generic year-to-year wage growth driven by job changes, but also
within jobs we see a significantly larger wage increase from 2014 to 2015 and also
to 2016 when the general minimum wage came into and was in effect compared to
the pre-reform years. This confirms our conclusions from above that there is indeed
a wage effect at the bottom of the distribution induced by the minimum wage reform
(sub-section 5.1 above; see also Caliendo et al., 2017). This effect is more pronounced
for job stayers than for all employed. As indicated, individuals who change jobs often
realize wage increases independent from labor market regulations. At the same time
we also see a more pronounced reduction in contractual working hours in the balanced
panels of employees and job stayers after the introduction of the minimum wage. This
confirms findings from Stewart and Swaffield (2008); Bellmann et al. (2016); Bossler
and Gerner (2016); vom Berge and Weber (2017) and Caliendo et al. (2017) and adds
the reduction of working hours, most likely initiated by employers, as another ad-
justment channel and mitigating factor for a limited pass-through of hourly wages to
earnings and income.
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6 Conclusion
This paper attempts to close an important gap in the empirical literature on the min-
imum wage in Germany. This case is of general interest as the introduction of the
German minimum wage was one of the largest ‘field experiments’ in labor and public
economics in recent history. A statutory minimum wage with substantial bite, particu-
larly in certain regions and for specific groups of employees, was introduced in a large
economy with a generous welfare state. To this day, redistributive motives for the min-
imum wage are articulated by policy-makers. Yet, credible empirical evidence on the
distributional impact of the minimum wage is still lacking for Germany. One important
reason is that, apart from few exemptions, the federal minimum wage applies to all em-
ployees on the labor market. The are no natural control groups available. In addition,
a distributional analysis needs to take potential equilibrium effects into account.
Therefore, we decided to abstain from a causal research design in the narrower
sense that is based on treatment and control groups. Accordingly, we do not make
strong causal claims in this paper. Instead we provide systematic descriptive evidence
in a number of dimensions and paint a comprehensive distributional picture in terms
of hourly wages, disposable household income and specific redistributive goals as well
as several potential underlying mechanisms. The group of people that are eligible
and affected by the minimum wage is followed in a longitudinal perspective between
2012 and 2016. We construct a consistent panel of individuals and households for
this period. “Affected” individuals are defined according to their position relative to
the cross-sectional wage distribution in a given year. Most other studies determine
people affected by the minimum wage solely based on the wage distribution before the
reform. This approach is prone to measurement error which – as we showed – can
be substantial in widely used survey data as the SOEP. Additional bias can arise from
year-to-year job fluctuations that are disproportionately high at the bottom of the wage
distribution and lead to movements into and out of the group of potentially affected
individuals. We provided evidence for this mechanism.
We found unequivocal evidence for wage increases at the bottom of the hourly
wage distribution. The effects lie, however, substantially below the potential the mini-
mum wage would have had under full compliance. This is the main reason for a limited
impact on wage inequality. Further, we could confirm results from ex ante simulations
and evidence from other countries that the minimum wage is not an effective tool for
income redistribution and the reduction of poverty. It is not able to target individuals
in needy households. Low wage earners are not concentrated at the bottom of the dis-
tribution of disposable household incomes in Germany. They are spread out over the
middle and also higher parts of the distribution. We found only limited evidence for the
withdrawal of welfare transfers on the basis of simulated eligibility and claims. Ad-
ministrative statistics on unemployment assistance and top-up benefits (“Aufstocker”)
receipt indicate that this is not a first order mechanism. We also did not find evidence
that the incidence or structure of low wage employment changed significantly as a re-
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sult of the minimum wage. In terms of overall income inequality the situation has even
deteriorated after the introduction of the minimum wage as disposable incomes at the
bottom end grew slower than average incomes. We showed that a higher minimum
wage level of 12e per hour as demanded from certain policymakers would not change
these findings at all.
What do our results mean for the future policy discussion about minimum wages?
First, we provide further evidence that the minimum wage cannot significantly reduce
income inequality and poverty. This holds all the more in comprehensive welfare states
with generous social insurance benefits. Fair wages and fair competition on the labor
market are more legit and attainable policy goals for a minimum wage. In light of
current discussions about substantial increases of the minimum wage level in order
to eventually reach these redistributive goals, our findings may serve as a cautionary
tale. Second, some of our results point to methodological issues for the analysis of
minimum wage effects based on household survey data on earnings and working time.
Besides manifest measurement issues in terms of hourly wages, we found substantial
year-to-year job and thus wage fluctuations. This can introduce bias in studies relying
on a single pre-reform measure of the group affected by the minimum wage. Further
efforts should be undertaken to improve the data base on hourly wages in Germany to
enable more credible evidence on the empirical effect of the minimum wage. Third,
the comparison of observed outcomes with hypothetical upper bound effects in our
full-compliance scenario points to a substantial non-compliance problem of the mini-
mum wage in the first two years after introduction. There is need for further action to
implement current minimum wage regulations. Yet, it remains unclear to what extent
this can be explained by cheating employers and employees exactly. There may be
certain areas where defining and measuring hourly wages is inherently problematic.
There is need for further research in this area. Fourth, instead of pushing up the min-
imum wage to much higher levels, our results on underlying mechanisms rather point
to severe problems of employability of individuals in low income households as well
as discontinuities and job insecurities for low wage earners. There is a glaring need to
improve the labor market attachment of individuals in the bottom decile of the income
distribution. Moreover, more research and policy action is needed to improve employ-
ment conditions of low wage earners beyond their hourly wage. Both would help to
decrease income inequality and poverty.
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Appendix
Additional figures
Figure A1: Distributions of hourly wages, all eligible employees – robustness: un-
weighted, 2012-2016
Notes: The vertical line depicts the minimum wage level of 8.50e per hour.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
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Figure A2: Distributions of hourly wages, eligible employees affected by the mini-
mum wage: hourly wages below the 11th quantile of the yearly hourly
wage distribution – robustness: unweighted, 2012-2016
Notes: The vertical line depicts the minimum wage level of 8.50e per hour.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Figure A3: Distributions of hourly wages, eligible employees affected by the min-
imum wage – robustness: hourly wages below the 20th quantile of the
yearly hourly wage distribution, weighted, 2012-2016
Notes: The vertical line depicts the minimum wage level of 8.50e per hour.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
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Figure A4: Distributions of hourly wages, eligible employees affected by the min-
imum wage – robustness: hourly wages below the 20th quantile of the
yearly hourly wage distribution, unweighted, 2012-2016
Notes: The vertical line depicts the minimum wage level of 8.50e per hour.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Figure A5: Distributions of contractual working hours of affected employees,
weighted, 2012-2016
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
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Additional tables
Table A1: Share of employees with hourly wages below 8.50e per hour in % –
robustness: only German citizenship
Year Unbalanced panel Balanced panel
All CI eligible CI All CI eligible CI
2012 8.5 [8.0;9.0] 9.7 [9.1;10.3] 5.9 [5.1;6.6] 5.7 [5.0;6.5]
2013 8.5 [8.0;9.0] 9.7 [9.1;10.3] 5.6 [4.9;6.2] 4.8 [4.1;5.5]
2014 8.1 [7.6;8.6] 9.3 [8.7;9.9] 4.2 [3.6;4.8] 3.7 [3.1;4.3]
2015 5.9 [5.5;6.4] 6.8 [6.3;7.4] 2.5 [2.1;3.0] 2.1 [1.6;2.6 ]
2016 5.4 [5.0;5.9] 6.1 [5.6;6.7] 2.6 [2.2;3.1] 2.1 [1.6;2.5]
N 53,508 46,843 20,995 18,205
Notes: The balanced panel contains 4199 observations per year and 3641 for those eligible throughout
this time. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Table A2: Share of employees with hourly wages below 8.50e per hour in % –
robustness: only German citizenship, unweighted
Year Unbalanced panel Balanced panel
All CI Eligible CI All CI Eligible CI
2012 9.8 [9.3;10.4] 11.2 [10.6;11.9] 6.7 [5.9;7.4] 6.7 [5.9;7.5]
2013 9.6 [9.0,10.1] 11.0 [10.4;11.6] 6.0 [5.3;6.7] 5.5 [4.8;6.2]
2014 8.5 [8.0;9.1] 9.8 [9.2;10.4] 4.7 [4.1;5.4] 4.3 [3.7;5.0]
2015 6.3 [5.9;6.8] 7.3 [6.8;7.8] 3.1 [2.6;3.6] 2.7 [2.2;3.2]
2016 5.8 [5.3;6.3] 6.5 [6.0;7.0] 2.8 [2.3;3.3] 2.3 [1.8;2.8]
N 53,508 46,843 20,995 18,205
Notes: The balanced panel contains 4199 observations per year and 3641 for those eligible throughout
this time. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
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Table A3: Percentiles of the hourly wage distribution, only eligible employees –
robustness: only German citizenship
Year Percentiles Median
P1 P5 P10
CI CI CI CI
2012 4.66 [4.39;4.85] 7.20 [6.99;7.47] 8.60 [8.44;8.74] 15.54 [15.17;15.76]
2013 4.75 [4.45;5.20] 7.20 [6.99;7.40] 8.58 [8.38;8.74] 15.51 [15.25;15.73]
2014 4.80 [4.69;5.27] 7.23 [7.13;7.53] 8.63 [8.50;8.84] 15.97 [15.75;16.23]
2015 5.01 [4.40;5.48] 7.99 [7.58;8.19] 9.20 [8.99;9.41] 16.74 [16.39;16.96]
2016 5.41 [5.24;6.12] 8.27 [8.11;8.45] 9.32 [9.11;9.53] 16.78 [16.35;17.05]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 8.50 8.50 9.20 [9.03;9.36] 16.74 [16.51;17.07]
2016 8.50 8.50 9.32 [9.11;9.56] 16.78 [16.50;17.02]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 12.00 12.00 12.00 16.74 [16.43;17.04]
2016 12.00 12.00 12.00 16.78 [16.51;17.08]
Notes: Weighted with individual frequency weights. Samples M1, M2, M3, M4 included. Bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Table A4: Percentiles of the hourly wage distribution, only eligible employees –
robustness: only German citizens, unweighted
Year Percentiles Median
P1 P5 P10
CI CI CI CI
2012 4.28 [3.99;4.66] 6.91 [6.77;6.99] 8.20 [8.06;8.38] 15.36 [15.29;15.56]
2013 4.61 [4.30;4.75] 6.99 [6.71;7.02] 8.29 [8.16;8.43] 15.33 [15.15;15.48]
2014 4.72 [4.61,4.85] 7.13 [7.02;7.28] 8.58 [8.43;8.66] 15.92 [15.73;16.07]
2015 5.31 [4.97;5.33] 7.83 [7.66;7.99] 8.99 [8.90;9.20] 16.51 [16.32;16.75]
2016 5.52 [5.31;5.90] 8.16 [8.04;8.26] 9.11 [9.08,9.23] 16.51 [16.30;16.78]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 8.50 8.50 8.99 [8.87;9.17] 16.51 [16.32;16.76]
2016 8.50 8.50 9.11 [9.05;9.30] 16.51 [16.25;16.72]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 12.00 12.00 12.00 16.51 [16.32;16.72]
2016 12.00 12.00 12.00 16.51 [16.30;16.77]
Notes: Weighted with individual frequency weights. Samples M1,M2,M3,M4 included. Bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
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Table A5: Inequality measures, poverty measures for hourly wages, only eligible em-
ployees – robustness: only German citizenship
Year Inequality Poverty measures
Atkinson Poverty rate Poverty gap FGT(2)
CI CI CI CI
2012 0.20 [0.18;0.21] 13.77 [11.83;15.03] 2.82 [2.51;3.06] 0.99 [0.85;1.10]
2013 0.20 [0.18;0.21] 13.42 [11.92;14.84] 2.75 [2.47;3.01] 0.91 [0.80;1.04]
2014 0.20 [0.19;0.21] 14.71 [13.84;15.56] 2.94 [2.59;3.18] 0.94 [0.81;1.08]
2015 0.20 [0.18;0.21] 14.19 [12.67;15.15] 2.72 [2.34;3.05] 0.89 [0.73;1.06]
2016 0.19 [0.18,0.21] 14.15 [12.90;15.16] 2.43 [2.06;2.73] 0.72 [0.59;0.86]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 0.17 [0.16;0.18] 14.19 [12.99;14.97] 1.59 [1.38;1.77] 0.22 [0.18;0.26]
2016 0.17 [0.16;0.18] 14.15 [12.98;15.48] 1.57 [1.32;1.74] 0.21 [0.16;0.25]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 0.13 [0.12;0.14] 0.00 0.00 0.00
2016 0.13 [0.11;0.14] 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Poverty line at 60% of median wage. FGT(2) and FGT(3) denote FGT (α) = 1n ∑
q
i=1
( z−yi
z
)α
for
z := poverty line and q := number of poor, with α= 2 and α= 3 respectively. Weighted with individual
frequency weights. Samples M1,M2, M3,M4 included. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in
parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Table A6: Inequality measures, poverty measures for hourly wages, only eligible em-
ployees – robustness: only German citizenship, unweighted
Year Inequality Poverty measures
Atkinson Poverty rate Poverty gap FGT(2)
CI CI CI CI
2012 0.22 [0.21;0.23] 14.05 [13.61;15.43] 3.23 [3.04;3.41] 1.16 [1.04;1.26]
2013 0.22 [0.21;0.23] 13.92 [13.29;14.62] 3.05 [2.87;3.21] 1.05 [0.96;1.14]
2014 0.22 [0.21;0.22] 15.20 [14.53;15.65] 3.12 [2.93;3.25] 1.04 [0.94;1.11]
2015 0.20 [0.19;0.21] 14.00 [13.02;15.17] 2.71 [2.45;2.94] 0.84 [0.75;0.95]
2016 0.20 [0.19;0.21] 14.19 [13.35;15.03] 2.41 [2.21;2.60] 0.71 [0.62;0.79]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 0.18 [0.17;0.19] 14.00 [13.07;15.11] 1.54 [1.36;1.70] 0.20 [0.16;0.23]
2016 0.18 [0.17;0.18] 14.19 [13.32;15.08] 1.47 [1.27;1.64] 0.18 [0.15;0.22]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 0.13 [0.13;0.14] 0.00 0.00 0.00
2016 0.13 [0.13;0.14] 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Poverty line at 60% of median wage. FGT(2) and FGT(3) denote FGT (α) = 1n ∑
q
i=1
( z−yi
z
)α
for
z := poverty line and q := number of poor, with α= 2 and α= 3 respectively. Weighted with individual
frequency weights. Samples M1, M2, M3, M4 included. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in
parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
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Table A7: Percentiles of monthly disposable household equivalence income in e –
robustness: only German citizenship
Year P5 P10 Mean Median N
CI CI CI CI
2012 626 [602;642] 714 [695;729] 1838 [1797;1915] 1519 [1480;1547] 10,693
2013 636 [622;648] 721 [707;738] 1879 [1835;1929] 1534 [1505;1566] 10,829
2014 665 [651;673] 740 [726;759] 1949 [1883;2017] 1592 [1548;1632] 9,445
2015 664 [639;677] 758 [740;772] 1979 [1918;2051] 1620 [1587;1660] 8,746
2016 658 [643;671] 760 [728;789] 2187 [2105;2281] 1729 [1678;1783] 7,382
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 667 [639;678] 760 [735;776] 1986 [1928;2060] 1631 [1582;1663] 8,746
2016 658 [646;674] 769 [734;791] 2191 [2107;2288] 1733 [1691;1785] 7,382
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 668 [645;682] 764 [741;779] 2007 [1944;2078] 1655 [1618;1692] 8,746
2016 658 [645;674] 772 [738;802] 2210 [2118;2312] 1767 [1718;1811] 7,382
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale. Weighted with household frequency
weights. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Table A8: Percentiles of monthly disposable household equivalence income in e –
robustness: only German citizenship, unweighted
Year P5 P10 Mean Median N
2012 661 [653;669] 769 [762;779] 1775 [1754;1813] 1397 [1383;1419] 10,693
2013 676 [664;683] 785 [770;793] 1815 [1778;1843] 1443 [1421;1465] 10,829
2014 687 [674;696] 806 [787;817] 1890 [1850;1927] 1518 [1494;1544] 9,445
2015 696 [684;710] 813 [799;827] 1913 [1879;1950] 1554 [1525;1575] 8,746
2016 704 [693;713] 843 [828;858] 2265 [2206;2328] 1738 [1704;1773] 7,382
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 700 [683;709] 818 [804;829] 1919 [1877;1965] 1561 [1533;1580] 8,746
2016 704 [691;719] 852 [833;870] 2269 [2218;2328] 1741 [1702;1777] 7,382
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 704 [690;713] 821 [809;834] 1938 [1892;1982] 1589 [1565;1606] 8,746
2016 708 [694;719] 856 [839;871] 2288 [2249;2337] 1776 [1744;1804] 7,382
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale Household frequency weights by SOEP.
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; all samples included, own calculations.
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Table A9: Inequality measures, poverty measures of net household income –
robustness: fixed poverty line (whole sample with weights)
Year Poverty measures
Poverty rate Poverty gap FGT(2) Poverty
CI CI CI line
20123 22.71 [20.63;24.67] 5.63 [5.00;6.25] 2.40 [2.05;2.75] 928.17
2013 23.01 [20.84;25.04] 5.43 [4.85;6.07] 2.21 [1.91;2.54] 928.17
2014 21.04 [19.34;22.31] 5.04 [4.56;5.51] 2.20 [1.90;2.53] 928.17
2015 21.21 [18.91;23.53] 4.95 [4.31;5.66] 2.12 [1.78;2.50] 928.17
2016 19.44 [17.38;21.25] 4.63 [4.02;5.22] 1.98 [1.65;2.38] 928.17
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 20.29 [18.16;22.13] 4.80 [4.21;5.39] 2.06 [1.72;2.39] 928.17
2016 18.83 [16.88;20.60] 4.51 [3.90;5.08] 1.94 [1.61;2.29] 928.17
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 19.51 [17.58;21.35] 4.71 [4.14;5.33] 2.03 [1.72;2.39] 928.17
2016 18.28 [16.29;19.91] 4.42 [3.84;5.04] 1.91 [1.58;2.30] 928.17
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale. Household frequency weights used.
Poverty rate kept fix on 2014 level. FGT (α) = 1n ∑
q
i=1
( z−yi
z
)α
for z := poverty line and q := number of
poor. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Table A10: Inequality and poverty measures of net household income – robustness:
only German citizenship
Year Inequality Poverty measures
Atkinson Poverty rate Poverty gap FGT(2) Poverty
CI CI CI CI line
2012 0.55 [0.44;0.66] 21.4 [20.1;22.2] 5.4 [4.9;5.8] 2.3 [2.1;2.7] 911.7
2013 0.46 [0.41;0.51] 21.9 [20.8;23.3] 5.2 [4.8;5.7] 2.2 [1.9;2.5] 920.1
2014 0.51 [0.45;0.57] 21.9 [20.7;23.3] 5.4 [4.8;5.9] 2.3 [1.9;2.7] 955.0
2015 0.48 [0.42;0.54] 23.0 [21.9;24.5] 5.6 [5.1;6.1] 2.4 [2.0;2.7] 972.1
2016 0.53 [0.47;0.60] 23.6 [22.5;25.3] 6.3 [5.8;6.9] 2.7 [2.4;3.1] 1037.5
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 0.48 [0.42;0.54] 22.4 [21.0;23.7] 5.5 [5.1;6.0] 2.3 [2.1;2.7] 978.5
2016 0.53 [0.47;0.59] 23.2 [22.1;24.7] 6.2 [5.6;6.8] 2.7 [2.3;3.1] 1039.8
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 0.48 [0.41;0.55] 22.2 [21.1;23.4] 5.6 [5.2;6.1] 2.4 [2.1;2.7] 993.2
2016 0.53 [0.47;0.60] 23.4 [22.0;24.6] 6.3 [5.8;6.8] 2.7 [2.4;3.1] 1060.1
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale. Poverty rate determined by year.
FGT (α) = 1n ∑
q
i=1
( z−yi
z
)α
for z := poverty line and q := number of poor. Weighted with household
frequency weights. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
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Table A11: Inequality and poverty measures of net household income –
robustness: only German citizens, unweighted
Year Inequality Poverty measures
Atkinson Poverty rate Poverty gap FGT(2) Poverty
CI CI CI CI line
2012 0.47 [0.39;0.59] 14.0 [13.3;14.8] 3.1 [2.8;3.3] 1.3 [1.2;1.5] 838.3
2013 0.39 [0.36;0.42] 14.8 [14.2;15.8] 3.1 [3.0;3.4] 1.3 [1.2;1.5] 865.8
2014 0.41 [0.37;0.45] 16.2 [15.1;17.1] 3.4 [3.2;3.7] 1.4 [1.2;1.6] 911.0
2015 0.40 [0.35;0.43] 17.1 [16.0;18.4] 3.6 [3.4;3.9] 1.5 [1.3;1.7] 932.5
2016 0.49 [0.44;0.53] 20.2 [19.5;21.2] 4.8 [4.5;5.1] 1.9 [1.8;2.1] 1042.8
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 0.40 [0.37;0.43] 16.8 [15.7;17.7] 3.6 [3.3;3.9] 1.5 [1.3;1.6] 936.5
2016 0.48 [0.44;0.53] 19.8 [18.9;20.7] 4.7 [4.4;5.1] 1.9 [1.7;2.1] 1044.6
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 0.40 [0.36;0.45] 17.3 [16.4;18.1] 3.7 [3.5;4.0] 1.5 [1.4;1.7] 953.1
2016 0.48 [0.44;0.52] 20.1 [19.2;21.1] 4.9 [4.6;5.2] 2.0 [1.8;2.2] 1065.3
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale. Household frequency weights by SOEP.
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses. Poverty rate determined by year. FGT (α)=
1
n ∑
q
i=1
( z−yi
z
)α
for z := poverty line and q := number of poor.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
Table A12: Inequality measures, poverty measures of net household income –
robustness: fixed poverty line (only german citizens no weights)
Year Poverty measures
Poverty rate Poverty gap FGT(2) Poverty
CI CI CI line
2012 19.25 [17.73;20.39] 4.14 [3.77;4.43] 1.68 [1.53;1.84] 911.04
2013 18.31 [17.27;19.85] 3.80 [3.55;4.14] 1.51 [1.36;1.66] 911.04
2014 16.20 [15.07;17.10] 3.45 [3.21;3.75] 1.40 [1.25;1.56] 911.04
2015 15.48 [14.11;16.77] 3.33 [2.98;3.66] 1.38 [1.19;1.57] 911.04
2016 13.29 [12.37;14.95] 3.04 [2.82;3.39] 1.33 [1.19;1.57] 911.04
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 14.91 [13.73;16.28] 3.25 [2.96;3.57] 1.35 [1.18;1.53] 911.04
2016 12.87 [11.95;14.28] 2.97 [2.70;3.32] 1.31 [1.14;1.51] 911.04
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 14.43 [13.19;15.81] 3.19 [2.92;3.49] 1.33 [1.17;1.53] 911.04
2016 12.40 [11.32;13.70] 2.90 [2.62;3.22] 1.29 [1.10;1.49] 911.04
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale. Household frequency weights used by
SOEP. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses. Poverty rate kept fix on 2014 level.
FGT (α) = 1n ∑
q
i=1
( z−yi
z
)α
for z := poverty line and q := number of poor.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
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Table A15: Top-up benefits and welfare receipt – robustness: only German citizenship
Year Eligible for top-up benefits (%) Social assistance transfer e per year
stated
CI eligibility CI take-up CI
2012 10.3 [9.4;11.1] 1871.5 [1769.7;1956.1] 675.5 [626.8;729.1]
2013 10.7 [9.9;11.4] 1995.0 [1876.6;2147.5] 714.4 [658.9;779.8]
2014 11.0 [10.2;12.2] 1876.1 [1782.3;2020.8] 740.1 [645.3;839.8]
2015 10.0 [8.9;11.2] 1937.7 [1807.2;2071.6] 687.4 [598.7;772.3]
2016 9.8 [8.7;11.0] 1808.3 [1692.3;1960.7] 748.1 [663.9;833.1]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 9.2 [8.3;10.2] 1858.9 [1754.6;1965.7]
2016 9.3 [8.4;10.1] 1754.2 [1645.7;1878.9]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 8.1 [7.2;8.8] 1777.2 [1646.3,1950.3]
2016 8.3 [7.5;9.5] 1681.1 [1570.4;1828.5]
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale. Household frequency weights by SOEP.
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2015; own calculations.
Table A16: Top-up benefits and welfare receipt – robustness: only German citizens,
unweighted
Year Eligible for top-up benefits (%) Social assistance transfer e per year
stated
CI eligibility CI take-up CI
2012 13.8 [13.1;14.4] 2426.4 [2334.1,2516.7] 917.2 [875.2;974.6]
2013 14.1 [13.5;14.8] 2458.7 [2350.5,2554.9] 981.8 [920.6;1044.4]
2014 13.3 [12.7;14.0] 2251.3 [2154.4;2353.2] 912.3 [851.3;970.7]
2015 11.9 [11.3;12.6] 2335.9 [2229.7,2415.2] 895.0 [826.7;951.7]
2016 10.9 [10.0;11.6] 1944.1 [1857.2;2043.9] 842.6 [771.8;904.1]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 8.50e per hour
2015 11.4 [10.6;12.0] 2256.0 [2156.5,2340.4]
2016 10.5 [9.8;11.2] 1894.2 [1824.1;1983.6]
Full compliance scenario, minimum wage level: 12e per hour
2015 9.9 [9.3,10.5] 2133.9 [2048.1;2238.2]
2016 9.4 [8.7;10.1] 1787.6 [1715.9;1886.9]
Notes: Equivalence weights according to the new OECD scale. Household frequency weights by SOEP.
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2015; own calculations.
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Table A20: Eligible individuals in the bottom 11% of the hourly wage distribution –
robustness: unweighted
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Threshold wage in e 8.37 8.64 8.81 9.32 9.32
Employment categories in %
- full time 46.2 46.9 47.5 48.7 43.1
- part time 14.2 15.5 16.3 16.54 18.0
- marginal 28.3 24.3 26.0 23.6 20.2
Contractual working hours per week
- mean 28.5 28.6 28.1 28.7 28.3
- median 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.5 30.5
Sectors (in %)
Agriculture 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.8 0.5
Energy 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2
Manufacturing 14.2 14.6 12.4 12.2 12.1
Construction 5.2 5.3 3.8 4.8 6.1
Trade 30.4 31.9 28.7 31.2 26.6
Transport 4.8 5.2 4.2 6.2 6.1
Bank, Insurance 1.3 1.1 1.3 0.5 0.7
Services 37.5 39.0 41.4 38.7 40.2
Observations 1166 1097 991 937 821
Notes: Affected individuals: bottom 11% of the hourly wage distribution – reference: share of individ-
uals who earned less than 8.50e per hour in 2013.
Source: SOEP, waves 2012-2016; own calculations.
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